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THE WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 
A LEGAL POSITION PAPER* 
INTRODUCTION 
We do not need less criticism in time of war, but more. It is to be 
hoped that the criticism will be constructive, but better unfair 
criticism than autocratic suppression. 
-Woodrow Wilson 
THIS document is submitted in the spirit expressed above by President Wilson. It was prepared in the hope that its pre-
sentation might help effect a change in the foreign policy of the 
United States in Southeast Asia. It is in a way a dissenting opin-
ion, a rebuttal to the official justifications which have been offered 
for President Nixon's recent action in Cambodia and for the 
larger United States involvement in VietNam. At a time when 
irrationality and heightened emotionalism characterize the foreign 
policy debate on both sides, it is imperative that reasonable men 
make their voices heard. 
The sections which follow deal with the legal questions 
arising out of the United States' actions in Southeast Asia. 
Though recognizing that many nonlegal factors must be involved 
in the determination of foreign policy, we believe that the thresh-
old questions must be legal in nature. This is particularly true 
in any society predicated on the rule of law, where official actions, 
however wise, can be acceptable only if legally justifiable. 
We recognize that any criticism of the Administration's 
foreign policy is always susceptible to the retort that those who 
criticize lack access to the numerous sources of information which 
the President has at his command. This argument, however, if 
pressed beyond its reasonable limits, would totally isolate the 
President's policies from public debate. When accepted by mem-
bers of Congress, it becomes particularly dangerous, as it inhibits 
the legislative branch from the proper exercise of its constitu-
tional responsibilities. As Congressman Abraham Lincoln ob-
served about another President in another war: 
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Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever 
he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion and you allow him 
to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary 
for such purpose-and you allow him to make war at pleasure. 
Study to see if you can fix any limit to his power in this respect, 
after you have given him so much as you propose.1 
PART ONE 
QUESTIONS UNDER DOMESTIC LAW 
I 
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CONFLICT 
The President may not act unilaterally to initiate or con-
duct a war. Indeed, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
specifically provides that the power "to declare war" shall rest 
with Congress. The initial question in this discussion must thus 
be whether the present Southeast Asian conflict amounts to a 
"war" in the constitutional sense; if it does not, its conduct may 
well be within the executive prerogative. 
American courts have traditionally given a broad interpreta-
tion to the term "war." The Supreme Court in the Prize Cases2 
held that a state of war exists whenever a nation prosecutes its 
rights by force. While it is doubtful that any modern court would 
employ so sweeping a definition, it is clear that when a given 
conflict reaches a certain level of intensity, the constitutional 
requirement is satisfied. In 1953 in United States v. Bancrojt,8 
the Court of Military Appeals, construing the term "war" as 
used in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, stated: 
We believe a finding that this is a time of war ... is compelled 
by the very nature of the conflict; the manner in which it is carried 
on; the movement to, and the presence of large numbers of 
American men and women on the battlefields ••• ; the casualties 
involved; the sacrifices required; the drafting of recruits to main-
tain the large number of persons in the military service • • . ; and 
the tremendous sums being expended .•.. 4 
Application of these criteria to the Southeast Asian conflict 
reveals that it qualifies as a war. Since 1965 over 2,500,000 
Americans have served in Southeast Asia. Present troop strength 
is reported at 427,000; however, such strength has in the past 
been as great as 543,400. Of these, 41,733 have been killed and 
1 E. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 451 (1964). 
2 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
3 3 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 11 C.M.R. 3 (1953). 
4 Id. at 5, 11 C.M.R. at 5. 
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275,724 wounded-more casualties than the United States suf-
fered in World War I. The monetary cost of the war is also 
telling. At the beginning of 1969, the Defense Department stated 
that the cost of the war was about $28 billion per year. To this 
date the war has cost Americans $104.5 billion.5 In 1968 over 
50 per cent of the nation's entire airpower was committed to 
military activities in Viet Nam.6 In addition, more bomb tonnage 
has been dropped in Southeast Asia than was dropped on Ameri-
ica's European enemies during World War IJ.'I' These factors 
clearly indicate that the Southeast Asian conflict is in fact a 
''war.''8 
II 
LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT'S POWER AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
Having determined that the Southeast Asian conflict is a 
war in the constitutional sense, it follows that the President's 
power to initiate or conduct military activities is narrowly cir-
cumscribed. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 'ZJ. Sawyer, the 
Supreme Court in 1952 ruled that there are only two sources of 
presidential power-an express grant from the Constitution 
itself or a constitutionally valid act of Congress.9 The following 
paragraphs will demonstrate that the President lacks authority 
to conduct present military operations in Southeast Asia since 
the power "to declare war" is expressly entrusted to Congress 
and thereby removed from the presidential prerogative. Further, 
it will be shown that Congress has not exercised this power 
through a delegation to the President or otherwise. 
A. President's Military Power Under the Constitution 
1. Legislative History 
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he 
President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States," but the legislative history of the Commander-
in-Chief clause indicates that the power so delegated to the Pres-
ident was quite limited in scope. The Constitution was written 
with the desire to avoid many of the evils of the monarchies of 
Europe. The Framers were aware that while kings and princes 
5 The figures in this paragraph were supplied by the Department of Defense 
in a telephone conversation of May 11, 1970. 
6 114 Cong. Rec. 6490 (daily ed. 1968) (remarks of Senator Young). 
'1 See note 5 supra. 
8 United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 594, 38 C.M.R. 392, 398 
(1968) (Ferguson, J., concurring). 
9 343 u.s. 579, 585 (1952). 
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made wars, it was the people who paid with their money and 
lives. Thus, by voice vote the Constitutional Convention refused 
a proposal to give the President the power to declare war and 
limited his powers instead to those of Commander-in-Chie£.10 
These Presidential powers were intended to be substantially less 
than those traditionally exercised by the English monarch. 
Though the king could declare war and raise and regulate armed 
forces, the Constitution reserved these powers in the new republic 
to Congress alone. The President's power as Commander-in-
Chief was intended to be nothing more than the supreme com-
mand and direction of the military and naval forces as "first 
general and admiral of the confederacy.'m The President was 
not to be vested with vast war powers which could be exercised 
arbitrarily and without authorization. 
Another clear expression of the limited extent of the Pres-
ident's power is found in Article I, Section 8, which grants to 
Congress the power "to declare war." The original draft of the 
Constitution conferred upon Congress the power to "make" war, 
but several delegates objected that this terminology might lead 
to an interpretation that the President might himself commence 
a war. To render such an interpretation impossible, the draft 
was amended by substituting the word "declare."12 
2. Early Cases 
The Supreme Court has upheld the limitations on the Pres-
ident's war power intended by the Framers of the Constitution 
in those few cases that have dealt with the President's power as 
Commander-in-Chief. In Little v. Barreme/3 the Court held that 
the President had exceeded his powers in ordering the Navy to 
seize ships coming from French ports, since Congress' consent 
to hostilities was limited to ships going to French ports. In 
Fleming v. Page,14 the Court, while not expressly deciding the 
point, nevertheless addressed itself to the scope of the President's 
war-making power. "His duty," wrote the Court, "and his power 
are purely military. As commander-in-chief, he is authorized to 
direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by 
10 J. Madison, Debates in tbe Federal Convention of 1787, at 418-19 (G. Hunt 
& J. Scott eels. 1920). 
11 The Federalist No. 69, at 516 (J. Hamilton ed. 1882) (A. Hamilton). 
12 2 J. Madison, Journal of tbe Federal Convention 548 (Scott ed. 1893). 
See also 2 M. Farrand, The Records of tbe Federal Convention 313, 318-19 
(1911). 
13 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
14 50 U.S. (9 How.) 602 (1850). 
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law at his command ••.. m5 In Ex Parte Milligan,16 the Court 
held that the President's military power to establish military 
courts of general jurisdiction could not be exercised in areas 
where constitutionally established courts were in operation. In 
a concurring opinion Mr. Chief Justice Chase made the following 
observation pertaining to the division of military powers between 
the executive and legislative branches: 
Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern 
armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide 
by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all 
legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and 
success, except such as interferes with the command of the 
fore~ and conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong 
to the President as commander-in-chiefP 
From the statement of the Chief Justice one can clearly infer 
that neither branch may interfere with powers expressly granted 
to the other. Thus, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, may 
not interfere with either the powers of Congress to raise, support 
and govern the armed forces or to declare war. 
3. History of Executive Actions 
Both the legislative history of the Constitution and case 
law support the conclusion that the President may not unilaterally 
initiate and conduct a war. Indeed, were it not for numerous 
instances of the President's unilaterally taking military action, 
there would be little question of his inability to do so. In 1966, 
however, the Department of State sought, in part, to justify 
American involvement in Southeast Asia by citing 125 "similar" 
actions in which the President had ordered troops into action or 
position without obtaining prior congressional authorization.18 
A closer examination of these instances reveals the dangerously 
misleading nature of the Department's assertion. 
The early history of congressional involvement in military 
affairs demonstrates that Congress in no sense abdicated its 
constitutional responsibilities. In the so-called "undeclared war" 
with France (1798-1800), President Adams felt the need for 
congressional authorization to wage what amounted to only a 
limited war.10 A unanimous Supreme Court affirmed the con-
11i Id. at 614. 
16 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
17 Id. at 139. 
18 Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Legality of the United 
States Participation in the Defense of Vietnam, 60 Am. J. Int'l L. 565, 579 (1966) 
[hereinafter Memorandum]. 
10 M. Pusey, The Way We Go to War 62 (1969). 
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gressional role in Bas v. Tingey20 where Justice Chase stated: 
"Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress 
may wage a limited war; limited in place, in object, in time."21 
When President Jefferson took action against the Tripolitan 
pirates in December 1801, he instructed the Navy to protect 
Americans but nevertheless restrained the United States forces 
from any but defensive actions without congressional approval.22 
In December 1801 Jefferson went to Congress requesting author-
ity23 to take offensive measures, which was ultimately granted.24 
In December 1805 Jefferson, fearing Spain might violate the 
Louisiana border, asked Congress for authority to use appropriate 
protective force.211 The Congress thought it unwise, however, and 
demurred.26 
Even the Monroe Administration, which in 1823 boldly 
announced a forceful United States foreign policy, showed defer-
ence to the constitutional authority of the Congress. Secretary 
of State John Quincy Adams informed the Colombian ambas-
sador that in reference to the use of military force under the 
Monroe Doctrine: "[B]y the Constitution of the United States, 
the ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative 
Department of the Government."27 
While there are several instances of the President's sending 
United States forces abroad, at no time during these early years 
did the President wage a war, limited or otherwise, without the full 
consent of Congress. In the nineteenth century there were some 
apparent deviations from the policy of congressional participa-
tion in military affairs, but in each case Congress vigorously 
asserted its prerogative. In May 1846 President Polk unilaterally 
undertook military operations against Mexico in response to what 
was arguably an invasion of United States territory. On January 
3, 1848, the House of Representatives declared that the war was 
"unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President of 
the United States."28 The Congress was similarly outspoken 
eight years later when President Pierce authorized United States 
20 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36 (1800). 
21 Id. at 43. 
22 1 T. Jefferson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents 327 (J. Richardson ed. 1896). 
23 '1 Annals of Congress 19 (1851). 
24 Id. at 327-29; 8 Annals of Cong. 1210-25 (1852). 
211 ill Abridgement of Debates of Cong. 348-49 (1857). 
26 Jefferson, supra note 22, at 389-90. 
27 The Record of American Diplomacy 185 (R. Bartlett ed. 1956). 
28 E. McCormac, James K. Polk-A Political Biography 530 (1922). 
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shelling of Greytown, Nicaragua.29 At the beginning of the twen-
tieth century the President again acknowledged congressional 
authority by seeking legislative authorization for military actions 
against Spain.30 The pattern of the formative years of the nation's 
history is clear-all three branches of government recognized 
Congress' sole authority to initiate and conduct war. 
In recent years the President has acted more independently 
than before in commencing military actions, but the constitu-
tional import of these unilateral uses of force remains unclear. 
In the first place, of the numerous instances cited by the Depart-
ment of State, it is uncertain how many qualify as "wars" in the 
constitutional sense. Secondly, assuming arguendo that a suffi-
cient number so qualify, it is by no means clear that such 
exercises of executive prerogative can operate to expand the 
Presidential powers granted by the Constitution. 
The o1zly conflict of this century which was arguably insti-
tuted by unilateral presidential action and which rivaled the 
present Southeast Asian situation in terms of duration, costs and 
troop commitment was the Korean conflict. The Korean "police 
action," which lasted for some three years, ultimately proved 
to be the fourth largest war in the nation's history, costing some 
30,000 lives and scores of billions of dollars.81 Moreover, some 
members of Congress, regarding the conflict as a "war," had 
grave doubts as to its constitutional propriety. Senator Robert 
S. Taft of Ohio, for example, stated that by sending American 
forces to Korea at his own discretion and without legislative 
authorization, the President had "usurped power and violated 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.1132 
Some constitutional theorists have argued that a history of 
unchallenged executive practices can put a "gloss" on the Con-
stitution, i.e., that a history of congressional acquiescence in the 
exercise of a power by the President may create the authority 
for that exercise where it does not otherwise exist under the 
Constitution. The Supreme Court adopted this position in United 
States v. :Midwest Oil Co.88 The Court ruled that the long-con-
tinued practice of the President, with the tacit acquiescence of 
Congress, of withdrawing certain public lands that would other-
20 F. Wormuth, The Vietnam War: The President Versus the Constitution, 
in The Vietnam War 2nd International Law 24 (R. Falk ed. 1968). 
30 31 Cong. Rec. 3699 (1898}. 
31 A. Kelley & W. Harbison, The American Constitution 858 (3d ed. 1963). 
32 Id. 
83 236 u.s. 459 (1915}. 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 702 1970
702 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LA.W REVIEW [Vol. 45:695 
wise have been open to private acquisition, operated as a grant 
of implied power to the President to continue such withdrawals. 
As the Midwest Court made clear, the finding of such 
implied power depended on the existence of a long-continued 
executive practice coupled with congressional acquiescence. But 
the proposition that the President acting unilaterally can take 
this country to war in the constitutional sense can be justified 
if at all, only on the basis of the Korean precedent, an argument 
which scarcely demonstrates a long-continued executive practice. 
Moreover, assuming that any life remains in the Midwest hold-
ing, neither that case nor any other Supreme Court case bas ever 
held that an implied grant of power to the President may be 
found as a result of congressional acquiescence in the exercise of 
a Presidential power expressly granted to Congress by the Con-
stitution. Thus, it is doubtful that even the rationale of the 
Midwest case could be applied to executive exercise of Congress' 
war power. 
Further, the Supreme Court itself in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer4 has virtually abandoned the :Midwest hold-
ing. Ruling that President Truman's seizure of a steel mill with-
out congressional authority could not be justified by virtue of 
the fact that previous Presidents bad acted similarly, the Court 
observed: 
It is said that other Presidents without congressional authority 
have taken possession of private business enterprises in order to 
settle labor disputes. But even if this be true, Congress has not 
thereby lost its exclusive constitutional authority to make laws 
necessary and proper to carry out the powers vested by the Consti-
tution "in the Government of the United States, or any Department 
or Officer thereof."35 
The Court's holding seems eminently reasonable, for otherwise 
we are left in the absurd position of affirming the proposition 
that the President can increase his power by means themselves 
unconstitutional. 
4. President's Power to Repel Attack 
The Government has argued, quite correctly, that the power 
of the President as Commander-in-Chief includes the power to 
engage in hostilities, without congressional authorization, in order 
to repel armed attack against the country. At the Constitutional 
Convention the wording of the provision granting Congress the 
34 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
85 Id. at 588-89. 
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power to "make" war was changed allowing Congress to "de-
clare" war instead. The reason for the change was, inter alia, to 
permit the President to defend against attacks on his own initia-
tive, as Congress might be slow to meet such an emergency.36 
This exception to the exclusivity of Congress' power to declare 
war is, however, narrowly circumscribed. 
As previously observed, in granting the power to initiate 
war solely to Congress, it was the Framers' intention that a 
decision of such gravity should be made only by the representa-
tives of the people. The emergency power of the President to 
repel attack must be construed in light of this primary intent. 
While it is perfectly natural that the President was granted 
sufficient powers to protect the nation from irreparable harm in 
situations where the Congress could not be convened, that power 
must be viewed as only temporary. This was clearly the under-
standing of James Madison, who asserted that Congress retained 
most of the war power, thereby allowing the President to repel 
attacks but not to commence war.37 
Early Presidential actions support Madison's interpretation. 
In 1801 President Jefferson, though directing the Navy to take 
defensive measures against Tripolitan pirates, sought and re-
ceived a congressional grant of authority before authorizing 
offensive actions.38 In 1805 Jefferson, fearing an attack by Spain 
across the Louisiana border, asked Congress for authority to use 
appropriate protective force. Although his request was denied, 
the fact that Jefferson felt constrained to seek congressional 
authorization indicates the narrowness with which he construed 
his "defensive" powers.39 
B. President's :Military Powers Under Congressional Authority 
From the above discussion it is apparent that the President 
derives no authority from the Constitution unilaterally to initiate 
a war. Such power is vested only in Congress. The question 
remains, however, whether Congress may to any extent or under 
any circumstances delegate its exclusive military power to the 
Chief Executive. In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,40 the Supreme 
Court ruled that Congress may delegate certain of its powers to 
selected agents. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States/1 
30 See Madison, supra note 10, at 418-19. 
37 Id. 
33 See J cfferson, supra note 221 at 327. 
30 Id. 
40 293 u.s. 388 (1935). 
41 295 u.s. 495 (1935). 
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the Court ruled that any such delegation must be sufficiently 
specific as to the nature and scope of the powers authorized and 
as to the circumstances in which they may be exercised. The 
following discussion will demonstrate that Congress has not dele-
gated authority to the President to make the Cambodian incursion 
or to wage the Viet N am war. 
III 
THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION 
We can discern no possible legal justification for the Pres-
ident's actions in Cambodia. Many arguments have been ad-
vanced in favor of the legality of American operations in Viet 
N am. While we find none of these persuasive (as shall be demon-
strated below), they are at least arguable. One searches the 
record in vain, however, for any evidence which supports the 
constitutionality of the President's actions in Cambodia. 
The President, in his speech of April 30, 1970, offered at 
most one justification for unilaterally ordering the incursion into 
Cambodia-his power as Commander-in-Chie£.42 The President 
has no power as Commander-in-Chief to initiate or conduct a 
war save in the case of an armed attack. The question thus 
arises whether the President's actions in Cambodia were in 
response to an armed attack. As will be discussed more fully 
later in this paper,48 no military forces were deployed from 
Cambodian sanctuaries against troops of either the United States 
or South Viet N am in a manner to make executive action imper-
ative without congressional consultation.44 Hence, the narrow 
constitutional requirements for unilateral Presidential action were 
not satisfied.45 
Since the President had no power to initiate the Cambodian 
operation unilaterally, his actions can be justified constitutionally 
only if undertaken pursuant to congressional authorization. We 
are unable to find such a legislative grant, nor has the Govern-
ment to date suggested one. None of the legal arguments ad-
vanced to show congressional authorization for United States 
presence in VietNam can be made with regard to our involve-
ment in Cambodia. For example, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution46 
in its broadest interpretation cannot be stretched to authorize 
42 Address by President Nrxon, April 30, 1970, reprinted in N.Y. Times, 
May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
43 See Part Two infra. 
44 See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
45 See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra. 
46 78 Stat. 384 (1964). See Documentary Supplement infra. 
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the present incursion. Even assuming that this resolution author-
izes the American presence in VietNam, section 2 seems to limit 
our assistance to members or protocol states of the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO), a category that does 
not include Cambodia.47 Likewise, Congress has neither appropri-
ated funds for military activities in Cambodia nor specifically 
authorized troop commitments there. Indeed, the evidence sug-
gests that the only congressional consideration of possible Cam-
bodian activities resulted in opposition to such a commitment 
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.48 
In view of these conclusions, it is most disturbing that the 
President, being the officer of the Government expressly entrusted 
with the responsibility to see that the laws of the land are faith-
fully enforced, should so blatantly ignore his constitutional re-
sponsibilities. Such action can only serve to undermine confidence 
in the President and to exacerbate the growing disrespect for 
law throughout the country. 
IV 
THE VIET NAM WAR 
We need not here repeat the reasons why the present conflict 
in VietNam qualifies as a war in the constitutional sense.49 Nor 
need we remake the arguments relative to the consequences 
resulting from such a characterization, viz., that the President 
lacks constitutional power to initiate or conduct a war without 
congressional authorization except in an emergency situation in 
response to an armed attack.60 
Even conceding that the President's initial exercise of mili-
tary power in Viet N am might have qualified as an emergency 
action, we have seen that the authority created under such excep-
47 Sept. 8, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28 
(effective Feb. 19, 1955). See Documentary Supplement infra. 
48 See N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1970, at 1, col. 8. It is also appropriate to note 
that on June 25, 1969, the Senate by a vote of 70-16 passed the so-called 
"National Commitments Resolution." S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
The Resolution was generally hailed as a congressional attempt to reassert its 
voice in decisions committing United States forces for use in foreign territories. 
It provides: 
Whereas accurate definition of the term "national commitment" in recent 
years has become obscured: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is 
the sell£e of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States 
to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative 
action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the United States 
Government through means of a treaty, convention, or other legislative 
instrumentality specifically intended to give effect to such a commitment. 
49 See Section I of this Part supra. 
uo See Section II of this Part supra. 
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tion expires when it is first possible to place the matter before 
Congress.51 The President himself tacitly acknowledged this 
limitation in seeking the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution from Con-
gress in August 1964. Since it is impossible to justify our present 
military actions in VietNam as a response to an armed attack, 
the sole remaining question is whether Congress itself has author-
ized such actions in any constitutionally permissible manner. 
A. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 
The executive branch has repeatedly claimed that the Gulf 
of Tonkin Resolution52 constitutes congressional authorization 
for the extensive military operations in Viet N am. Indeed, 
Under Secretary of State Katzenbach went so far as to call the 
resolution the "functional equivalent" of a congressional decla-
ration of war.53 An examination of the legislative history of the 
resolution, however, does not support this conclusion. 
Statements made on the floor of Congress and in hearings 
before congressional committees indicate the limited nature of 
legislative intent with respect to the resolution. Senator 
Fulbright, one of the sponsors, indicated that the purpose of 
the resolution was "to prevent the spread of war, rather than 
to spread it."54 Further, the message from President Johnson 
in support of the congressional authorization stated in part: 
"As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no 
rashness and seeks no wider war.m5 The executive branch also 
promised that Congress would not be ignored after enactment 
of the resolution. Secretary of State Rusk declared: "[I]f the 
Southeast Asia situation develops . . . there will continue to be 
close and continuous consultation between the President and 
Congress."56 
During the Senate debates Senator Brewster stated that he 
"would look with dismay on the landing of large armies on 
the continent of Asia," and asked Senator Fulbright if the 
resolution would approve "the landing of large American armies 
in Vietnam or China."57 Senator Fulbright replied: "There is 
til See Madison, supra note 10, at 419. 
52 78 Stat. 384 (1964). See Documentary Supplement infra. 
53 Senate Co=. on Foreign Relations, Statement of Nicholas deB. Katzen-
bach, Nat'l Commitments to Foreign Powers, S. Rep. No. 797, 90th Conr;., 
1st Sess. 82 (1967) [hereinafter Nat'l Commitments Hearing]. 
54 110 Cong. Rec. 18,462 (1964). 
55 110 Cong. Rec. 18,132 (1964). 
56 Statement of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Joint Hearing on Southeast 
Asia Resolution Before the Senate Co=. on Foreign Relations and the Senate 
Co=. on Armed Services, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964). 
57 110 Cong. Rec. 18,403 (1964). 
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nothing in the Resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I 
agree with the Senator that that is the last thing he would want 
to do."58 In the House Representative Thomas Morgan, Chair-
man of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, stated unequiv-
ocally: "The Resolution is definitely not an advance declaration 
of war. The committee has been assured by the Secretary of State 
that the constitutional power of Congress in this respect will 
continue to be scrupulously observed."59 In summary, the legis-
lative history demonstrates beyond doubt that in passing the 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Congress did not intend to declare 
war or to authorize the sustained, large-scale hostilities which 
have resulted. 
B. Ratification by Appropriation of Funds 
or by Congressional Inaction 
Proponents of the Administration's position have argued 
that by appropriating funds to support the military in VietNam, 
Congress has thereby authorized our participation in the war. 
This argument, however, cannot stand under scrutiny. 
Whether a Congressman agrees or disagrees with the policy 
of the President in Southeast Asia, he can neither morally nor 
politically deny weapons, shelter and food to American soldiers 
facing daily attack. Congress is forced to appropriate money to 
keep American soldiers alive, even if their lives are endangered 
solely as a result of executive usurpation of Congress' power to 
declare war. This fact has been recognized both by those who 
have supported the President's policy and by those who have 
opposed it. Senators Richard Russell,60 Sam Ervin/1 Joseph 
Clark,62 Peter Dominick,63 Bourke Hickenlooper/4 and Repre-
sentative Paul Findley65 have all recognized that Congress had 
no choice but to protect the lives of soldiers already in the field. 
In addition, before passing a Viet N am appropriations bill in 
March 1966, numerous Congressmen and Senators indicated that 
their votes were not to be interpreted as authorizing large-scale 
military escalation.66 
Ratification by appropriation is constitutionally impermis-
liB Id. 
li!l 100 Cong. Rec. 18,539 (1964). 
60 112 Cong. Rec. 4370, 4372 (1966). 
()1 Nat'l Commitments Hearing, supra note 53, at 219-20. 
62 112 Cong. Rec. 4382 (1966). 
63 Nat'l Commitments Hearing, supra note 531 at 246. 
64 Id. at 219, 248. 
65 Id. at 235. 
66 N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1966, at 1, col. 7. 
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sible for another reason. In Greene v. McElroy,67 the Supreme 
Court stated that where executive action is of dubious constitu-
tionality, it is not sufficient to argue that Congress has impliedly 
ratified the action by appropriating money. Explicit ratification 
is necessary to insure "careful and purposeful consideration 
by those responsible for enacting and implementing our laws. 
Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great consti-
tutional import and effect would be relegated by default to 
administrators who, under our system of government, are not 
endowed with authority to decide them."68 Thus, appropriation 
of funds to keep American soldiers alive constitutes neither 
congressional approval of the President's policy nor, even if 
such approval were intended, the necessary explicit ratification 
of the President's actions required by the Constitution.69 
The above principles apply with even greater force to the 
argument that ratification of presidential actions in Viet N am 
may be implied from congressional acquiescence. Since the Su-
preme Court has held that ratification cannot be implied from 
the affirmative act of appropriation, a fortiori, congressional 
inaction cannot be construed as constituting the necessary rati-
fication. The decision of the Supreme Court in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer10 supports this conclusion. Holding 
that Presidential seizure of a steel mill could not be jusified on 
grounds that previous Chief Executives had taken similar actions 
without congressional approval, the Court concluded that the 
failure of Congress to disapprove the former exercises of Presi-
dential power in no way reduced Congress' "exclusive constitu-
tional authority" in the field.71 
PART TWO 
QUESTIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
I 
CAMBODIA 
A. Collective Self-Defense Under the 
United Nations Charter 
The legal justification under international law for the incur-
sion of United States forces into Cambodia was presented in a 
67 360 u.s. 474 (1959). 
68 Id. at 507. 
69 See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
70 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra. 
71 343 U.S. at 588. 
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letter of May 5, 1970, from the Permanent Representative of 
the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Charles 
Yost, to the President of the Security CounciF2 The letter 
stated that the United States action in Cambodia was taken as 
a measure of "collective self-defense.1173 In essence, this same 
justification has been employed to explain all United States 
military actions in Viet Nam and it forms the foundations of 
the March 1966 Department of State Memorandum on the 
legality of United States participation in the defense of Viet 
Nam.74 
It is important, therefore, to consider the meaning of the 
concept of "collective self-defense" as embodied in Article 51 
of the United Nations Cha.rter.75 Article 51 constitutes an 
exception to the basic article 2 ( 4) obligation of members of the 
United Nations to "refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force." Article 51 states in part: "Nothing 
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a. member of the United N a.tions until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security." Military action taken in self-defense which does not 
satisfy the article 51 exception results in a prima. facie violation 
of the obligations assumed under the Charter. The invocation 
of self-defense as the justification for the use of force depends 
on the satisfaction of two preconditions: (1) the existence of 
an "armed attack" and (2) a response proportionate to that 
attack.76 
1. Armed Attack 
The United States asserted no credible claim of an actual, 
physical armed attack on allied forces in South Viet N am. The 
right of collective self-defense is the right of the state which 
bas been the victim of an armed attack, not of a. would-be 
protector. Even assuming that the threat of an armed attack 
would qualify as an armed attack under article 51, the military 
activities of North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia merely raised 
72 United Sta~ Notification to the United Nations Sec:urity Council of Self-
defense Measures Taken by the United States and the Republic of Viet-Nam 
Armed Forces, UN. Doc. S/9781 (1970) [hereinafter Yost Letter]. See Docu-
mentary Supplement infra. 
73 Id. at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
74 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565. -
75 UN. Charter art. 51. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
76 Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the"Vret Nam War, 
75 Yale L.J. 1122, 1135-36, 1143 (1966). 
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the possibility of an attack. But this possibility was so remote 
in time as to fall outside the meaning of a "threat of armed 
attack." 
Traditionally, the use of armed force against another nation 
in self-defense has been restricted. For example, the Caroline, 
an American vessel used for supplies and communication in a 
Canadian insurrection, was boarded in an American port at 
midnight by an armed group acting under the orders of a 
British officer. The boarding party set the vessel afire and let it 
drift over Niagara Falls. The United States protest resulted in an 
apology by Lord Ashburton, the British Special Commissioner 
to the United States. In a note of reply of August 6, 1842, 
Secretary of State Webster stated the limited circumstances in 
which self-defense may be used: 
[R]espect for the inviolable character of the territory of inde-
pendent states is the most essential foundation of civilization ..•• 
Undoubtedly it is just, that, while it is admitted that exceptions 
growing out of the great law of self-defense do exist, those excep-
tions should be confined to cases in which the "necessity of that 
self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of 
means and no moment for deliberation.m7 
When the United Nations Charter was originally drafted, 
an armed attack was generally understood as an action through 
which a state sought the initiative by the violent exercise of 
physical power.78 Since then, some have argued for an expanded 
concept which would include a military process rather than 
a single, hostile, offensive event.79 The Department of State's 
1966 Memorandum espoused this broadened concept. Specif-
ically, the Memorandum argued that the concept of an armed 
attack includes the processes of externally supported subversion, 
clandestine provision of arms, infiltration of armed personnel, 
and introduction of regular units of the North Vietnamese Army 
into South Viet Nam.80 
The Department of State's broad description of armed 
attack fails to fall within Secretary Webster's more restricted 
definition. Many modern treaty instruments of the United States 
define an armed attack in a limited way which resembles 
11 2 J. Moore, A Digest of International Law § 217, at 412 (1906). See also 
R. Hull & T. Novogrod, Law and Vietnam 139-47 (1968). 
78 Alford, The Legality of American Military Involvement in Viet Nam: A 
Broader Perspective, 75 Yale L.J. 1109, 1114 (1966). 
79 Id. at 1113. 
so Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565. 
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Webster's definition and not that of the Department of State.81 
For example, Article 2 5 of the Charter of the Organization of 
American States82 differentiates unequivocally between an armed 
attack and other forms of aggression. This distinction is also found 
in Articles 3 and 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance of 1947,83 in the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,84 
and in the United States-Japanese Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security of 1960.8G In each treaty, measures of collective self-
defense taken against an armed attack are justified under Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter. 
Even more revealing is Article 2 of the SEATO Treaty,86 
which specifically distinguishes between armed attack and "sub-
versive activities directed from without." Article 4(1) authorizes 
unilateral action in response to "aggression by means of armed 
attack" and requires an immediate report of the action to the 
Security Council of the United Nations. Moreover, article 4(2) 
provides for consultation in case of threats "in any way other 
than by armed attack" or "by any other fact or situation which 
might endanger the peace of the area." (Emphasis added.) 
The United States clearly sought to conform Article 4(1) of 
SEATO to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to allow 
unilateral use of armed force only in case of an armed attack,87 
and article 51 has always been understood to embody a narrow 
construction of armed attack.88 Thus, United States incursions 
into Cambodia could only be justified under article 51 if they 
were in response to an armed attack emanating from Cambodia. 
President Nbmn described the alleged threat from within 
Cambodia in his televised address to the Nation on April 30, 
1970, as follows: 
North Vietnam in the last two weeks has stripped away all pretense 
of respecting the sovereignty or neutrality of Cambodia. Thousands 
81 Armed attack is also the controlling term in the Warsaw Treaty which 
established the Warsaw Pact. See 219 U.N.T.S. 3 (effective Oct. 10, 1955). 
82 Apr. 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 
(effective Dec. 3, 1951). 
83 Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681, TJ.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77 
(effective Dec. 3, 1948). 
84 Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, TJ.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 
(effective Aug. 24, 1949). 
85 Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1632, T.I.A.S. No. 4509, 372 U.N.T.S. 267 
(effective Aug. 12, 1960). 
sa SEATO Treaty art. 2. See note 47 supra. 
87 Hearing on Executive K Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 4 (1954). 
88 Lawyers Comm. on American Policy Towards Viet Nam, Vietnam and 
International Law 27 (1967) [hereinafter Lawyers Comm.]. 
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of their soldiers are invading the country from the sanctuaries; 
they are encircling the capital of Phnom Penh. Coming from 
these sanctuaries, as you see here, they have moved into Cambodia 
and are encircling the capital. 
[I] f this enenty effort succeeds, Cambodia would become a 
vast enemy staging area and a springboard for attacks on South 
Vietnam along 600 miles of frontier-a refuge where enemy troops 
could return from combat without fear of retaliation.89 
Apparently, the attack to which the President referred was 
the increasingly intensive strife between Cambodian and North 
Vietnamese forces. The joint United States-South Vietnamese 
response involved an attempt to prevent a defeat of the Govern-
ment in Phnom Penh. Indeed, the President confirmed this view 
in a later portion of his speech: "[T]he aid we will provide will 
be limited for the purpose of enabling Cambodia to defend its 
neutrality and not for the purpose of making it an active bel-
ligerent on one side or the other.mo 
Ambassador Yost's letter to the President of the Security 
Council referred to base areas maintained for five years by the 
North Vietnamese in Cambodia for purposes of conducting mil-
itary operations against South Viet Nam.91 The letter identified 
the developments which triggered United States' action as the 
expansion by the North Vietnamese of the perimeters of their 
base areas, the expulsion of any remaining Cambodian presence 
in those areas, the linking of the base areas into a continuous 
chain along the South Vietnamese border, and the extension of 
the bases deeper into Cambodian territory.92 The letter asserted 
that North Vietnamese forces were massing in those areas in 
preparation for attacks against South Viet Nam.93 
Both President Nixon's address and the Yost letter dis-
played concern over the enlargement and extension of military 
staging areas in Cambodia. Certainly the use of all of Cambodia 
as a base of operations against South Viet N am would increase 
the strength and flexibility of North Vietnamese operations. 
However, it strains both language and credibility to consider 
the enlargement of a base of operations as an armed attack. 
One might properly characterize North Vietnamese activity in 
Cambodia as an effort to facilitate the threat of an armed attack. 
89 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 2 (emphasis added). See Documentary 
Supplement infra. 
90 Id. at col. 3 (emphasis added). 
91 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
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But this threat was sufficiently distant in time as to render 
meaningless any attempt to equate the threat of armed attack 
with an "armed attack" as defined under article 51. The latent 
threat of hostile action launched from a neighboring state has 
not traditionally justified resort to armed force in preemptive 
self-defense.94 For instance, in the Nuremberg trial of war 
criminals the court dealt with the defense "that Germany was 
compelled to attack Norway to forestall an allied invasion and 
her action was therefore preventive.m5 The tribunal said: 
[I]t must be remembered that preventive action in foreign ter-
ritory is justified only in case of "an instant and overwhelming 
necessity for self-defense, leaving no choice of means and no 
moment of deliberation." •. • From all this [evidence as to German 
belief regarding an allied attack on Norway] it is clear that when 
the plans for an attack on Norway were being made they were not 
made for the purpose of forestalling an imminent allied landing, 
but, at the most, that they might prevent an allied occupation at 
some future date. . . . In the light of all the available evidence 
it is impossible to accept the contention that the invasions of 
Denmark and Norway were defensive and in the opinion of the 
Tribunal they were acts of aggressive war.96 
Thus, even if the threat of an armed attack qualifies as 
an armed attack, that threat must be imminent. But President 
Ni."'i:on, in response to a reporter's question at the President's 
press conference, indicated that the Administration considered 
that the threat might not materialize for at least one year.97 
Therefore, the United States crossed an international boundary 
and employed armed force in response to a threat which was by 
04 Lawyers Comm., supra note 881 at 1. 
Ou Quoted in C. Bishop, International Law 778-79 (1962). 
oa Id. (emphasis added). 
07 Q. On April 20, you said Vietnamization was going so well that you could 
pull 150,000 American troops out of Vietnam. Then you turned around 
only 10 days later and said that Vietnamization was so badly threatened 
you were sending troops into Cambodia. Would you explain this apparent 
contradiction for us? 
A. Well, I explained it in my speech of April 20, as you will recall, because 
then I said that Vietnamization was going so well that we could bring 
150,000 out by the spring of next year, regardless of the progress in the 
Paris talks and the other criteria that I had mentioned. 
But I also had warned at that time that increased enemy action in 
Laos, in Cambodia, as well as in Vietnam was something that we had 
noted and that if I had indicated and if I found that that i1zcreased 
e11emy action would jeopardize the remaining forces who would be in 
Viet11am, I would take stro1tg actio1t to deal with it. 
I foUIId that the action that the enemy had taken in Cambodia would 
leave the 240,000 Americans who would be there a year from now without 
many combat troops to help defend them would leave them in an tmtenable 
position. That's why I had to act. 
N.Y. Times, May 9, 1970, at 8, col. 1 (emphasis added). 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 714 1970
714 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:695 
no means imminent. Attempting to justify preemptive actions 
exclusively in terms of such a distant threat does violence to 
the clear meaning of article 51. Furthermore, such an overly 
broad definition of an armed attack eliminates the distinction 
between the concepts of armed attack and self-defense. A defen-
sive measure which anticipates an attack by one year can itself 
be interpreted as an armed attack necessitating self-defensive 
measures.98 To allow self-defense in circumstances which legally 
entitle the aggressor in turn to respond in self-defense is to 
destroy the purpose of the United Nations Charter, i.e., to limit 
the use of self-defense only to a response to an immediate 
threat.99 
As previously stated, the assertion of a claim of collective 
self-defense is the right of the victim state, not of the would-be 
protector.10° Collective self-defense involves the right of a nation 
to request assistance in its defense. It differs fundamentally from 
any contention that third-party nations have a discretionary 
right to intervene by force in conflicts between other countries.101 
Thus, even if the North Vietnamese launched some sort of armed 
attack, the question of determining the victim of such an attack 
would remain. The North Vietnamese activity, according to the 
United States' argument, constituted an armed attack because 
such activity involved the enlarging of staging and supply areas 
within Cambodia, troop movement in the direction of Phnom 
Penh but within Cambodia, and the possibility of an eventual 
threat by North Vietnamese forces within Cambodia to remain-
ing United States units in South Viet Nam.102 On these facts it 
is clear that the asserted thrusts of North Vietnamese main force 
units were directed against Cambodia. Cambodia, therefore, was 
the victim of an armed attack. 
The victim of an armed attack may invoke the justification 
of self-defense under the United Nations Charter.103 There is 
no indication, however, that Cambodia asserted a claim of self-
defense. Even if Cambodia had asserted such a claim, the United 
States could not legally have joined in an action of collective 
self-defense. Under the Charter the right of self-defense does 
not extend to a state which seeks to associate itself in the 
98 Falk, supra note 76, at 1136. 
99 For the legal justification of the right of self-defense in the U.N. Charter 
see L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the United Nations 244-48 
(1969). 
100 D. Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 216-18 (1958). 
101 Lawyers Co=., supra note 88, at 33. 
102 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
103 U.N. Charter art. 51. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
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defense of a state acting in self-defense.104 However, the United 
States did not invoke the doctrine of collective self-defense in 
conjunction with Cambodia, but in conjunction with South Viet 
Nam.105 The latter was not in this instance a victim of any 
armed attack, the tenuous justification in the Yost letter notwith-
standing. In addition, any assertion that South Viet N am has 
been the victim of an armed attack from Cambodia for a 
five-year period cannot be sustained. The fact that such hostilities 
could continue over five years without requiring measures of 
self-defense indicates that these hostilities did not create a need 
for self-defense which was instant. 
2. Proportionality 
The second precondition necessary for the justification of 
the use of armed force in self-defense under article 51 is that 
the response must be proportionate to the attack.106 A dispro-
portionate response will transform an otherwise justifiable exer-
cise of the right of self-defense into an act of aggression.107 
Ambassador Yost's letter stated that "North Vietnam has 
stepped up guerrilla actions into South Vietnam and is concen-
trating its main forces in these base areas in preparation for 
further massive attacks into South Vietnam.mos This factual 
assertion is not reflected in President Ni.'l:on's address of April 30 
or his subsequent press conference of May 9. The President indi-
cated that he was responding to the threat which would exist 
to United States forces following another withdrawal of 150,000 
men should North Vietnamese forces succeed in consolidating 
their position in Cambodia through the overthrow of the Govern-
ment of Premier Lon Nol or by a severe limitation of its 
power.100 Without dwelling on this crucial discrepancy, one 
cannot seriously say that the incursion into Cambodia of at least 
50,000 allied troops on six fronts with accompanying air sup-
port,110 a flotilla of 140 gunboats111 and a one-hundred mile 
allied blockade of the Cambodian coastline112 was a proportion-
10-1 Lawyers Comm., supra note 88, at 33. 
lOIS Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
106 Falk, supra note 76, at 1143. 
107 Because art. 51 is an e:..:ception to the general rule that use of armed force 
·without prior consultation with the United Nations is illegitimate, any use of 
armed force which does not fall within this exception is aggressive. 
lOB Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
109 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 3. 
110 N.Y. Times, May 10, 1970, § 4, at 3, col 1. 
111 N.Y. Times, May 12, 1970, at 1, col. 2. 
112 N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 1, col 4. 
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ate response of self-defense to "stepped up guerrilla actions,m13 
the only alleged new military action emanating from Cambodia. 
against South VietNam. 
B. The Neutrality of Cambodia 
As President Nixon affirmed in his address of April30, 1970, 
the United States has acknowledged Cambodian neutrality.m 
Respect for that neutrality was previously assured by a diplo-
matic note during the Johnson administration115 and was reiter-
ated on numerous occasions by repeated demands that North 
Viet Nam respect the neutrality and territorial integrity of 
Cambodia.116 
Generally, a neutral state must remain impartial toward 
belligerents and a belligerent state must respect the neutral's 
impartiality.117 A belligerent must also respect the territorial 
integrity of the neutral state. On the other band, a neutral state 
is obligated to prevent the use of its territory for the launching 
of attacks by one belligerent upon another.U8 A neutral state has 
the further duty to protest such violations. Failure to do so would 
offend its duty to maintain impartiality.119 However, the breach 
of its neutrality by either a belligerent state or the neutral state 
itself does not terminate neutral status.120 Only a declaration of 
war or hostilities amounting to acts of war by one of the belli-
gerents against the neutral will have that effect.121 
The Administration has argued that North Vietnamese 
forces have violated the territorial integrity of Cambodia by 
utilizing Cambodia as a base for military operations against 
South Viet N am.122 These actions certainly did constitute a breach 
by North Viet N am of Cambodian neutrality. But they have not 
terminated Cambodia's neutral status. Indeed, it bas been the 
announced, albeit unsuccessful, policy of the Cambodian Gov-
113 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
114 N.Y. Times, May 1, 1970, at 2, col. 1. 
115 United States Note to the Kingdom of Cambodia (Dec. 4, 1967), cited in 
58 Dep't State Bull. 124 (1968). 
116 The most recent United States affirmation of Cambodian neutrality was 
made in an address by the Secretary of State entitled "Two Aspects of the 
Search for Peace." Address by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Cornell 
Alumni Ass'n, Apr. 18, 1970. See Dep't State Publication 8525, Gen'l Foreign 
Policy Ser. 243 (May 1970). 
117 2 L. Oppenheim, International Law 673-74 (7th ed. 1948). 
118 Id. at 704. 
119 Id. at 675. 
120 Id. at 752. 
121 Id. at 753. 
122 Yost Letter, supra note 72, at 1. See Documentary Supplement infra. 
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ernment to keep its territory free of armed Viet Cong troops.12:.l 
Hence, under traditional principles of international law the move-
ment of American forces into Cambodia is itself a violation of 
that state's neutrality unless some further justification can be 
shown. 
The argument that Cambodia ratified the American action 
after it had taken place is not persuasive. In fact, two members 
of the Cambodian Government made an initial protest.124 Clearly, 
the joint United States-South Vietnamese incursion constituted 
a fundamental breach of Cambodian neutrality and could not 
later be legally justified by Cambodian acquiescence, particularly 
since the Cambodian Government had little choice but to 
acquiesce.125 Nor does the argument that the areas subjected to 
invasion were no longer under the effective political control of 
Cambodia justify the incursion. Political and military considera-
tions do not diminish the right of the Government of Cambodia 
to maintain its territorial integrity and neutrality. Otherwise, one 
could argue that South VietNam could claim no rights over Viet 
Cong-held portions of its own territory. Finally, the argument 
that Cambodia's failure to repel the North Vietnamese presence 
justified the United States incursions into this neutral country 
must fail in view of the United States' treaty obligation under 
Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter to first of all seek 
a solution of disputes, other than an armed attack, by peaceful 
means. 
C. Rights and Obligations Under SEATO 
The Administration did not attempt to justify its policy 
under the SEATO Treaty. The reluctance to invoke the SEATO 
Treaty commitment is understandable since the Cambodian incur~ 
sion was in violation of that treaty. The SEATO Treaty obligates 
the signatories to uphold the United Nations Charter.126 Since 
United States actions in Cambodia are violative of the Charter,127 
they therefore violate the SEATO Treaty as well. There are four 
additional reasons why the United States incursions into Cam-
bodia violated the SEATO Treaty. First, the treaty speaks of 
meeting "the common danger in accordance with its [each coun-
123 N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1967, at 17, col. 4. 
124 See statement of Foreign Minister, Yem Sambour, Time, May 11, 1970, 
at 13, col. 3; statement of Information Minister, Trinh Hoanh, N.Y. Times, May 
2, 1970, at 4, col. 4. 
125 The Cambodians could hardly afford to protest the United States' incur-
sion as they already found themselves on the defensive. 
126 SEATO Treaty art. 1. See note 47 supra. 
127 See Part Two, IA supra. 
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try's] constitutional processes.m28 The incursion into Cambodia 
is per se invalid under the treaty because under the United 
States Constitution such a decision must be made by Congress.129 
Second, articles 4(1) and 4(2) establish a distinction between 
an armed attack and "subversive activities directed from out-
side." As pointed out above, there occurred no armed attack to 
which the United States could respond. As the late Secretary of 
State John Foster Dulles cautioned, the treaty language does 
not support the contention that "any country which feels it 
is being threatened by subversive activities in another country 
is free to use armed force against that country.mso Third, the 
SEATO Treaty was further violated by the United States because 
it expressly requires that all the parties consult before taking 
any action to meet the common danger posed by such outside 
subversion.131 The United States made no effort to consult with 
the SEATO allies prior to taking action in Cambodia. Finally, 
the failure to obtain Cambodian consent or act in response to a 
Cambodian invitation resulted in a direct, unequivocal violation 
of SEATO's Article 4(3) because Cambodia was designated a 
state within the scope of Article 4 by the September 1954 Protocol 
to the SEATO Treaty.132 
D. The Position Taken by the United States in Analogous 
Situations 
The action taken by the United States in Cambodia is incon-
sistent with positions propounded by the United States in the 
past. When confronted with similar types of action initiated by 
other nations, United States spokesmen in the United Nations 
have consistently condemned unilateral attacks directed across 
national borders in pursuit of foreign troops using foreign soil 
as sanctuaries. 
1. Tunisia 
For example, in 1957 French forces operating in Algeria 
attacked Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in Tunisia, which was then being 
used as a sanctuary and staging area by Algerian revolutionary 
128 SEATO Treaty art. 4(1). See note 47 supra. 
129 See Part One supra. 
130 Statement of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Hearings on the 
President's Proposal on the Middle East Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 8lst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1957). 
131 SEATO Treaty art. 4(2). See note 47 supra. 
132 Protocol to the SEATO Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 87, T.I.A.S. 
No. 36 (effective Feb. 19, 1955). 
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forces. The United States publicly expressed concern about the 
incident and the Department of State summoned the French 
Ambassador to explain the French action.133 The official French 
explanation markedly paralleled the stated United States objec-
tive in Cambodia: to destroy enemy sanctuaries as well as stag-
ing and supply bases used by guerrilla forces for raids into 
Algeria. 
2. Yemen 
In 1964 Ambassador Stevenson, speaking in the Security 
Council, condemned a British bombing attack on Habir in Yemen 
which was undertaken in response to Yemeni attacks against the 
British Protectorate of Aden.134 
3. };fiddle East 
During the course of the present conflict in the Middle East, 
the United States has repeatedly expressed negative reactions 
ranging from concern to condemnation of Israeli attacks upon 
Arab guerrilla sanctuaries in Arab countries.13u The Israeli raids 
were designed to accomplish the dual objectives of reprisal and 
destruction of guerrilla sanctuaries and staging bases. The Amer-
ican incursion into Cambodia does not materially differ from 
these invasions, which were all condemned by the United States. 
Consequently, the Cambodian affair invites cynicism toward sub-
sequent United States' efforts to encourage respect for law in the 
conduct of international affairs. Finally, the allied incursions 
into Cambodia also compound the prolonged violation of inter-
national law by the massive military presence of the United 
States in VietNam. 
II 
VIETNAM 
A. Collective Self-Defense Under the United Nations Charter 
The Department of State Memorandum justified United 
States action in VietNam as collective self-defense in response 
to an armed attack.136 But the concept of armed attack under 
Article 51 of the Charter should be construed narrowly to restrict 
the right of self-defense to instances "when the necessity for 
183 38 Dep't State Bull. 333 (1958). 
134 19 U.N. SCOR, llOSth meeting 67 (1964). 
135 62 Dep't State Bull. 226 (1970); 60 Dep't State Bull. 340 (1969); U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/248 (1968); 58 Dep't State Bull. 509 (1968). 
136 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565-85. 
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action" is "instant, overwhelming and leaves no choice of means, 
and no moment for deliberations.m37 
Long-smoldering conditions of unrest, subversion and infil-
tration existed for ten years prior to American involvement 
in South Viet Nam. Before 1965, according to the Mansfield 
Report, infiltration from North Viet Nam "was confined pri-
marily to political leaders and military leadership." But by 1962 
"United States Military Advisors and service forces in South 
Viet Nam totaled approximately 10,000 men.mas Apparently, 
Department of Defense figures indicate that there were only 400 
North Vietnamese troops in South VietNam in March 1965.139 
Large numbers of North Vietnamese troops infiltrated into South 
Viet Nam only after the United States intervened in 1965 to 
prevent the collapse of the Saigon Government: 
U.S. combat troops in strength arrived at that point in response 
to the appeal of the Saigon authorities. The Vietcong counter-
response was to increase their military activity with forces 
strengthened by intensified local recruitment and infiltration of 
regular North Vietnamese troops. With the change in the composi-
tion of opposing forces, the character of the war also changed 
sharply.14o 
In view of the narrow definition of armed attack, the subversion 
in South Viet Nam before 1965 could not justify measures of 
collective self-defense under the Charter and could not allow 
attacks against North VietNam. 
The Viet Cong guerrilla attacks on Pleiku on February 7, 
1965, marked the beginning of active United States war actions 
in South VietNam and the extension of those actions into North 
Viet N am. However, no attempt was made to describe such war 
actions as collective self-defense. They were officially explained 
as reprisals. Labelling as provocations the attacks near Pleiku, 
in which seven Americans were killed and 109 wounded, Presi-
dent Johnson announced that "retaliatory [air] attacks against 
barracks and staging areas ... in North Vietnam [were] today 
[launched] in response to [these] provocations ordered and 
directed by the Hanoi regime.11141 
But reprisals involving the use of armed force violate the 
137 Moore, supra note 77, § 217, at 412; see text accompanying notes 77-88 
supra. 
138 The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance and the Shadow, Report Submitted 
to the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations 2 (Jan. 6, 1966) [hereinafter Mansfield 
Report]. 
130 Schlesinger, Vietnam and the 1968 Elections, 113 Cong. Rec. S14454 (daily 
ed. Oct. 9, 1967). 
140 Mansfield Report, supra note 138, at 1. 
141 52 Dep't State Bull. 238 (1965). 
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United Nations Charter.142 The Security Council condemnation 
of British raids against Yemen in April 1964 in reprisal for 
Yemeni attacks against the British Protectorate of Aden exem-
plified the United Nations position. Moreover, Ambassador Adlai 
Stevenson emphasized that the United States disapproved of 
"retaliatory raids, wherever they occur and by whomever they 
are committed.m43 
Under the United Nations Charter the United States repri-
sals were illegal in two other respects. First, they were not 
directed against insurgent forces in South VietNam, which staged 
the attack on Pleiku, but against North VietNam. Second, the 
massive bombing raids were totally disproportionate to the origi-
nal attacks to which they supposedly responded. The air raids 
vastly exceeded the force or destruction of the attacks near 
Pleiku and resulted in the escalation of the previous conflict 
into a war against North VietNam. 
The International Control Commission rejected the argu-
ments promulgated in justification of the American reprisals. On 
February 13, 1965, an ICC Special Report written by the Indian-
Polish majority advised the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Con-
ference that United States military actions against the North on 
February 7 and February 8, 1965, "indicated violations of the 
Ge11eva Agreement.m44 
B. Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter 
Article 33 ( 1) provides that "parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security," must first seek a solution by 
peaceful means of their own choice. Yet the United States did 
not seek a peaceful solution to the growing conflict in Indochina 
through the world body prior to using armed force. By 1954 
the United States had given aid to South Viet Nam and had 
operated a Military Assistance Command there since February 
1962. The United States has alleged that infiltration of troops 
from the North to the South has continued since at least 1959.14u 
142 U.N. Doc. A/16799 (XXII) (Sept. 26, 1967) ; U.N. Doc. S/RES/5650 
(1961) (United States and United Kingdom abstaining). 
143 19 U.N. SCOR, ll08th meeting 67 (1964). 
144 Special Report, June 2, 1962, para. 20, Hearings on Supplemental Foreign 
Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966-Vietnam Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 742 {1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings]. The 
Geneva Accords of 1954 art. 7 provide that "[n]o person, military or civilian, shall 
be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the 
the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized 
to enter by the Joint Commission." 
14u Memorandum, supra note 18, at 565. 
Imaged with the Permission of N. Y.U. Law Review 
HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 722 1970
722 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW £Vol. 45:695 
Nevertheless, the first American report to the Council was sub-
mitted only in 1964; 146 the United States did not submit the 
question of the Viet N am dispute to the Security Council until 
January 31, 1966,147 approximately one year after the commence-
ment of the bombing of the North. 
Potential means for a peaceful settlement included General 
de Gaulle's proposal in 1963 of a neutral Viet N am, 148 a subse-
quent French call in 1964 to reconvene the Geneva Conference 
on Laos/49 and a suggestion by Secretary-General U Thant in 
1964 that a secret meeting between representatives of North 
VietNam and the United States be arranged in Burma.u•o The 
United States rejected each of these alternatives over the three-
year intervening period between General Maxwell Taylor's 
Report of November 1961, which dealt with the possible con-
tingency of taking defensive measures directly against the 
North151 and the initiation of the bombing raids in 1965. During 
that period the United States must have contemplated the 
increased use of armed force against North Viet Nam. The 
failure to resort to the United Nations is therefore inexcusable. 
C. Duties and Rights Under SEATO 
SEATO provisions do not allow the United States to commit 
troops to South VietNam under the circumstances. Under Arti-
cles 1 and 6 of SEATO, any action in violation of the United 
Nations Charter cannot be justified under SEATO since those 
articles pledge the signatories' respect and support for the 
Charter. Although the Department of State's Memorandum 
speaks of the "obligation ... to meet the common danger in the 
event of armed aggression" under article 4(1), the precise word-
ing of the treaty language in article 4 ( 1) is "aggression by 
means of armed attack." Armed attack is narrower than armed 
aggression. As already discussed, North Vietnamese activities in 
South VietNam cannot be construed as an armed attack under 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.152 That the activities 
did not constitute an armed attack under SEATO is apparent 
from article 2 : 
146 Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating 
to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 132-35 (1965). 
147 Id. at 271-73. 
148 Id. at 14. 
149 Id. at 16. 
150 Staff of Senate Republican Policy Comm., The War in Vietnam, 113 Cong. 
Rec. 5242, 5250 (daily ed. May 9, 1967). 
151 The Vietnam Hearings 171-72 (Vintage ed. 1966). 
152 See text accompanying notes 136-143 supra. 
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In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, 
the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and 
effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to 
prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without 
agai1ZSt their territorial integrity and political stability. [Emphasis 
added.] 
Thus, under article 4(2), unless an armed attack has 
occurred, the parties must "consult immediately in order to agree 
on the measures which should be taken for the common defense." 
The Communique of the SEATO meeting, dated April 15, 1964, 
did not indicate a finding of an armed attack against South 
VietNam. It merely cautioned that members of SEATO should 
remain prepared to take further steps in fulfillment of their obli-
gations under the treaty.153 The United States has never obtained 
collective consent from SEATO members for its combat actions 
in Viet Nam. Consequently, the United States acted and con-
tinues to act in violation of SEATO's prohibition of unilateral 
military action except in case of an armed attack. If SEATO 
had approved United States' military operations in Viet Nam, 
such action would still have had to be authorized by the Security 
Council under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter as an 
enforcement action by a regional arrangement. In conclusion, the 
American violations of SEATO and the United Nations Charter 
completely undermine the argument that the United States must 
act in VietNam to demonstrate to other nations that the United 
States maintains its treaty commitments. 
D. The Geneva Accords of 1954 
The increase in hostilities since 1954 is obvious evidence of 
the fact that all the parties to the Viet N am conflict have violated 
the Accords. But in its Memorandum the Department of State 
argued that South Viet N am's violations of the Accords were 
justified by prior violations by North Viet Nam and relied on 
the principle that "a material breach of an agreement by one 
party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an 
equivalent, corresponding, or related provision until the default-
ing party is prepared to honor its obligations.m54 
At the outset it is necessary to indicate that both the United 
States and South Viet Nam are bound by the 1954 Geneva 
Accords. In Article 2 of the Treaty of Viet N am Independence 
of June 4, 1954,11m VietNam agreed to accept France's obliga-
153 50 Dep't State Bull. 692 (1964). 
154 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 577. 
155 161 British and Foreign State Papers 649 (1963). 
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tions with respect to VietNam. France was a signatory of the 
1954 Geneva Accords and orally agreed to the Final Declara-
tion.166 The United States is bound by the 1954 Accords as a "suc-
cessor" to France. Under Article 27 of the Accords, signatories 
and their successors are responsible for ensuring the observance 
and enforcement of the terms and provisions thereof. 
1. Election Provisions167 
In justifying South Viet Nam's refusal to implement the 
election provision of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the Department 
of State declared that "the South Vietnamese Government's fail-
ure to engage in consultations in 1955, with a view to holding 
elections in 1956, involved no breach of obligation. The condi-
tions in North Viet N am during that period were such as to make 
impossible any free and meaningful expression of popular will.mr;s 
But the alleged repression of the popular will in either North 
or South VietNam could not, under the Accords, entitle either 
regime to refuse to plan and consult about the elections for uni-
fication. Between July 1955 and July 1956 the two regimes were 
obligated to consult in order to determine the framework for the 
elections although South Viet N am was free to demand whatever 
safeguards it considered necessary for proper elections.m To the 
extent that the United States, as a successor to France, encour-
aged the Saigon government to avoid consultation, it breached 
its duty under Article 2 7 of the Accords to ensure the observance 
of its provisions. 
2. Articles 16 and 17160 
The Department of State Memorandum also contended that 
intensified Communist aggression in late 1961 justified a sub-
stantial increase in the number of military personnel and types 
166 Under international law oral agreements are binding. H. Briggs, The Law 
of Nations 838 (2d ed. 1952). 
157 Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, July 21, 1954, para. 7, Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 58 (1965) [hereinafter Final Declaration]. 
158 Memorandum, supra note 18, at 578. 
159 Final Declaration, supra note 157. 
160 Geneva Accords arts. 16 & 17 provide in part: art. 16: "With effect from 
the date of entry into force of the present Agreement, the introduction into 
Vietnam of any troop reinforcements and additional military personnel is pro-
hibited." ••• ; art. 17 (a): "With effect from the date of entry into force of the 
present Agreement, the introduction into Vietnam of any reinforcements in the 
form of all types of arms, munitions and other war material, such as combat 
aircraft, naval craft, pieces of ordnance, jet engines and jet weapons, and 
armored vehicles, is prohibited." 
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of equipment introduced into South Viet Nam. But the Inter-
national Control Commission, in a Special Report prepared 
by the Indian-Polish majority, specifically rejected the claim 
that increased aid was permissible for South Vietnamese self-
defense. The Report concluded: 
[T]he Republic of Vietnam has violated Articles 16 and 17 of the 
Geneva Agreement in receiving the increased military aid ••• 
[and] the establishment of a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory 
Command in South Vietnam, as well as the introduction of a large 
number of U.S. military personnel . , . amounts to a factual 
military alliance, which is prohibited under Article 19 of the 
Geneva Agreement.1G1 
m 
THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUING ARMED CONFLICT 
A fundamental violation of the United Nations Charter is 
particularly grievous when committed by such an immensely 
powerful and influential supporter of the United Nations as the 
United States. But should the United States succeed in legitimiz-
ing its position by claiming that measures of self-defense were 
justified in response to questionably documented armed attacks, 
the damage to the United Nations would be irreparable. The 
acceptance of a broad definition of armed attack would render 
virtually meaningless those provisions of the United Nations 
Charter which provide machinery for anticipatory conflict resolu-
tion. Conditions favorable to justice and respect for the obliga-
tions arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
could not be maintained. The determination, stated in the Pre-
amble, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" 
would become an empty hope. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States today faces a grave crisis. Never before 
in our history has the nation been so fundamentally divided over 
issues of foreign policy. More important, growing numbers of our 
citizens believe themselves frustrated in all efforts to change the 
course of policies they regard as unwise or immoral. The situa-
tion, if allowed to worsen, could have grave consequences for the 
future viability of our democracy. 
The debate over the nation's course in Southeast Asia reflects 
more than a mere disagreement with foreign policy. It indicates 
a dangerous shift in the balance of power within our constitutional 
161 1966 Hearings, supra note 144, at 740. 
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system. It is thus imperative, as never before, that the Congress 
vigorously reassert its responsibilities as the only branch of gov-
ernment constitutionally empowered to decide issues of war and 
peace. It is incumbent upon each member of Congress, whether 
he opposes or defends the present policy in Southeast Asia, to 
consider seriously the consequences of congressional inaction. 
We have witnessed in the atomic age a continual exacerba-
tion of the tensions which tend to divide the world community. 
When coupled with the exponential increase in the magnitude of 
man's destructive capabilities, this process invites disaster. There-
fore, actions by the world's most powerful nation which either 
violate or ignore the basic tenets of international law, as em-
bodied in the United Nations Charter, constitute culpable irre-
sponsibility. We are painfully aware that in this regard the 
United States does not stand alone. But historically the United 
States has represented itself as a moral force in the world and 
has repeatedly affirmed its faith in the rule of law. Quite simply, 
United States actions should conform to that rhetoric. Respect 
for the United Nations Charter and use of machinery for conflict 
resolution which exists under it must comprise the keystone of 
American foreign policy. Ultimately, our security in the world 
depends as much upon the foregoing considerations as upon the 
wise exercise of armed power. 
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